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h i g h l i g h t s
• We introduce a simple model of preferences on welfare transfers.
• Recipient’s wealth is a signal of needs and deservingness.
• Rational voters use a realistic function of wealth generation.
• A paradox may arise: the poorer the recipient is, the less transfer he/she will get.
• Future research: the negative impact of targeting on public support for welfare.
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a b s t r a c t
We present a model of preferences on welfare transfers, which incorporates the recipient’s wealth as a
signal of needs and deservingness. We show that a paradox may arise: the poorer the recipient is, the
less transfer he/she will get. Implications might include the negative impact of targeting assistance to the
poorest on public support for welfare.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The variation ofwelfare regimes in the advanced economies has
attracted considerable scholarly interest in the past few decades.
Students of various disciplines seem to agree that the public image
of the poor is key to the understanding of diverging institutional
frameworks.
We follow this line, and present a model of compassionate
voters’ preferences on welfare transfers to the poor. The model
shows that the uncertainty about the recipient’s behavior might
lead to paradoxical preferences: the poorer the recipient is, the
less transfer he/she would get. The paradox, we conjecture, may
contribute to some kind of institutional framing effects discussed
in the social policy literature.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.003As far as the behavioral assumptions are concerned, we draw
on those theories and evidence which point to ‘‘deservingness’’
as a key concept in voters’ minds. The voter (She) decides on
the optimal level of transfer for any poor individual (He). She
cannot observe the recipient’s efforts, but is informed about his
wealth, which indicates material needs, but also provides noisy
information on his efforts. His distress fuels her compassion, but,
at the same time, sends a negative signal about his efforts. This
ambiguity, in turn, may give rise to the paradox we discuss below.
2. The problem
The puzzle we address is posed by findings in polls which,
according to Larsen (2006), indicate that the targeting of poverty-
alleviating institutions to the very poorest might have an adverse
effect on public opinion: a smaller, poorer group of potential
beneficiaries implies a worse image of the poor and lower support
for welfare than a larger, more mixed set of welfare recipients.
Our model might lay the ground for understanding the above
results and the narrative arguments behind them. It is a much
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Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Benabou and Tirole (2006), and
Di Tella and Dubra (2013), which investigated the simultaneous
developments of beliefs, efforts, and redistribution. We only
concentrate on welfare transfers to the poor, and aim at pointing
to mechanisms which stem from recipients’ living standards as a
signaling device.
3. The model
Our approach partly relies on Besley and Coate’s (1992) model
of preferences on welfare transfers to the poor. Like their model,
we assume that voters intend to help distressed and deserving
individuals. That is, they support transfers which compensate for
poverty due to bad luck, but are reluctant to relieve distress which
stems from lack of effort. Some more comprehensive models on
redistributive preferences adopt similar assumptions (e.g., Alesina
and Angeletos, 2005; but see Di Tella and Dubra, 2010 for a
different approach), and a recent wave of economic research
argues in favor of their empirical validity (e.g., Fong and Luttmer,
2011; Konow, 2010). A great many findings of polls also indicate
the popular concern for deservingness (e.g., Gilens, 1999; Lepianka
et al., 2009). We also follow Besley and Coate’s (1992) approach by
assuming that voters are uncertain about the recipients’ behavioral
traits.
However, we introduce the level of the recipient’s wealth as a
key information for the voter’s decision on the optimal level of
transfer.Moreover, unlike theirmodel, we focus on the pure effects
of social preferences.
Let us start with a simple model of the compassionate voter’s
preferences in society S:
Ui = V (Wi)+

j
Dij(Wj, Ej, Fj),
where i, j ∈ S, and i ≠ j.W is a measure of living standards, and Ej
accumulates all themultiplicative factors ofWj for which i imposes
responsibility on j (e.g., personality traits such as effort). Fj, on the
other hand, accumulates multiplicative factors the voter is ready
to compensate j for (e.g., situational factors such as (mis)fortune).
The voter assumes thatW = EF .1
From now on we concentrate on the pure effects of social
preferences, namely Dij, which expresses the voter’s (dis)utility
stemming from observing the distress of misfortunate fellow
citizens. In this way, we simplify our analysis without altering our
qualitative results; and, more importantly, we make as clear as
possible that the paradoxwe show can emerge fully independently
of ‘the taxpayer’s resentment’.
The voter in our model cares only about the poorest and
misfortunate ones; namely, those who fall below the poverty
line, Wp, and whose efforts would justify higher living standards
than they have. Consider first the full information environment.
Observing a fellow citizen, her (dis)utility function takes the
following form:
Dij = 0 forWj = EjFmed or Wj = Wp, and
Dij = max(Wj − EjFmed,Wj −Wp) forWj < EjFmed
andWj < Wp (1)
where Fmed is the median value of ‘fortune’ in S. That is, the com-
passionate voter derives disutility from observing a poor individ-
ual who is less fortunate than the majority of the population in S
(see Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). Note that at any given level of
1 Note the difference between this approach and those of for example Alesina and
Angeletos (2005), or Di Tella and Dubra (2010).a poor person j’s ‘misfortune’ (where Fj < Fmed), the fall in i’s util-
ity increases with the efforts of j. This reflects the voter’s concern
for deservingness. It is plausible to assume that in a modern af-
fluent society EmedFmed > Wp. We do not exploit this assumption
below, but it ensures that the voter ignores only such poor who are
‘lazier’ than themajority of the society (Ej < Emed). One can also see
from (1) that i’s pure social preferences imply that the optimal level
of transfers to j is equal to max

min(EjFmed − Wj,Wp − Wj), 0

.
Note that if a poor enough individual j with personality traits Ej is
given, then the voter’s social preferences never justify any decrease
of transfers as j’s livings standards deteriorate in the full informa-
tion environment.
A crucial assumption of our model, however, is that the voter
cannot observe Ej and Fj directly. She observes, on the other hand,
Wj, and has prior beliefs on the distributions E and F . Based
on her priors and the observed Wj, the voter can estimate the
posterior probability distributions of j’s ‘effort’ and ‘fortune’. Those
posteriors can be used, in turn, to determine the optimal level
of transfers. In the most general case, this takes the form of an
expected utility maximization over the possible values of Fj. We
can state a general theorem in this framework. In this letter,
however, we deal with the easily tractable special case where
the preferred level of compensation is determined simply by the
median of j’s posterior effort, Eˆj(Wj, E, F). That is, the voter uses a
point estimation to calculate the optimal level of transfers.
We assume that the voter is informed about the scholarly
observation that the log-normal distribution is a good fit for
the empirical wealth distribution for much of the wealth range
(Chatterjee et al., 2007). In the voter’s model, E and F are
independent log-normal distributions whose product, W (which
is log-normal itself), approximates the observed distribution of
living standards in the society. Multiplicative constants do not
affect our model, so we can assume without loss of generality that
Emed = Fmed = 1. Then, based on i’s social preferences, beliefs, and
observation, one can express the optimal level of transfers to j as
follows:
T (Wj) = max

min(Eˆj −Wj,Wp −Wj), 0

.
Let us denote the logarithms of our variables with lower-case
versions. w = e + f . Note that we assume without loss of gener-
ality that e ∼ N(0, σ 2e ) and f ∼ N(0, σ 2f ). The parameters σe and
σf represent the voter’s prior beliefs on the relative strength of the
roles of E and F . w ∼ N(0, σ 2e + σ 2f ), so σ 2w = σ 2e + σ 2f is ob-
servable. Given this constraint, any belief on the variances of E and
F is compatible with rationality. We define the voter’s perceived
meritocracy index µ as σ 2e /σ
2
w .
After introducing the meritocracy index, we can formulate our
theorem on the paradox (subscript j is left out for convenience).
Theorem 1 (Existence of Poverty-Assistance Paradox). Consider any
W < W 1/µp . Then, T (ϵW ) < T (W ) for any 0 < ϵ < 1 iff W <
µ1/(1−µ).
The ratio of the population affected by the paradox cannot
be given in a closed form. Numerical calculations show that it
strongly and positively correlates with inequality, and (within
the constrains given by Wp) less strongly with the perceived
meritocracy.
4. Proof of the theorem
In our simple model, the median posterior effort has a particu-
larly clean form:
Proposition 1. Eˆ = Wµ.
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(e, f ), it is easy to prove that, conditioned on observingw = e+ f ,
the posterior distribution of e is again a Gaussian N(m(w), d2),
with parameters
d2 := 11
σ 2e
+ 1
σ 2f
= σ
2
e σ
2
f
σ 2w
and
m(w) := d
2
σ 2f
w = σ
2
e
σ 2w
w = µw.
From this we can indeed conclude that
Eˆ = expm(logW ) = Wµ. 
Proof of Theorem 1. We claim that T (W ) has a unique maximum
at Wmax := µ1/(1−µ). In our theorem, we only consider the case
where Wµ = Eˆ < Wp. In this case, T = Wµ − W . Taking the
derivative ofWµ −W , it is easy to see that it has a single positive
root atWmax, and that the second derivative is positive there. 
5. Conclusions
Our analysis sheds light on the implications of incorporating
recipients’ living standards as a signaling device into models on
welfare preferences. The emergence of the poverty-assistance
paradox we have described is highly dependent on the way beliefs
and preferences are modeled. We have shown that, given our
model on preferences, rational beliefs can easily produce the
paradox.
Our model on preferences lacks a direct preference for securing
a minimal income for anyone—irrespective of his behavior. It also
lacks a direct preference for punishing low effort. The former
assumption could inhibit the emergence of the paradox, and the
latter one would assist it.
Our research in progress deals with three important general-
izations of the base result: (i) additional observed and/or hidden
variables, (ii) not fully independent variables, and (iii) optimiza-
tion within the framework of expected utility maximization. It can
be shown that, even with these generalizations, the paradox arises
under very plausible assumptions.We have not presented a model of voting on redistribution.
We conjecture, however, that incorporating the assumptions
leading to the paradox into a political economy model could
help in understanding the adverse effects of targeting public
assistance to the poorest groups on welfare preferences better
(see Larsen, 2006). The intuition is straightforward: targeting to
the very poor may create a group of potential beneficiaries whose
members are, individually, less supported by the representative
voter than less distressed low-status persons outside this small
group. Nonetheless, a strong effect of ‘taxpayer resentment’ would
surely complicate any suchmodel, since targeting saves taxpayers’
money.
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